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PROHIBITION DURING PREGNANCY:
SUPPORTING MANDATORY OUTPATIENT
REHABILITATION FOR WOMEN WHO
GIVE BIRTH TO BABIES WITH
FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME
Grace Lykins*
“[F]etal alcohol syndrome is preventable—it need not
happen ever again. The future of society, in this instance
more than in most, is in our hands. We can’t claim
ignorance any longer.”1
INTRODUCTION
“By the time Seth was age two, he was totally out of
control.”2 Seth’s adoptive mother, a clinical social worker, later
reflected that if she were not experiencing life with Seth
firsthand that she “would have never believed a two year old
could have taken such control of a family’s life.”3 After moving
to a new school later in his childhood, Seth’s teacher petitioned

* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A., New York University,
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guidance, and encouragement throughout the process of writing this Note and
to especially thank the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their
thoughtful perspectives and meticulous revisions. I am eternally grateful to
my parents, Carolyn and Rennie Lykins, and to my brother, Jack Lykins, for
sharing their love of learning and for their immeasurable support in
everything I do.
1
MICHAEL DORRIS, THE BROKEN CORD 281 (Paperback ed. 1990).
2
Kathryn Shea, Raising a Child with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS),
NAT’L BIRTH DEFECTS PREVENTION NETWORK 1, http://www.nbdpn.org/
archives/2005/2005pdf/Seth_story.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2011).
3
Id.
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to have him removed from her class.4 Seth lasted less than one
month in his second classroom, when the teacher’s aide filed
assault charges against him, a felony charge when a student
assaults a school employee in Seth’s home state of Florida.5 By
age fifteen, Seth had participated in “more than sixteen different
medication trials,” and he currently takes five psychotropic
medications.6 Seth’s parents say, “[t]here is probably not a day
that goes by that he is not in some kind of pain, either
physically or emotionally.”7 Seth has Fetal Alcohol Syndrome,
and his troubled youth is just a preface for the future he faces.
“Fetal alcohol spectrum disorders (FASDs) are a group of
conditions that can occur in a person whose mother drank
alcohol during pregnancy.”8 Of the fetal alcohol spectrum
disorders, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (“FAS”) is the most severe.9
The impacts of FAS on children range from mild birth defects to
debilitating mental and emotional disabilities.10 At its core, FAS
is a byproduct of maternal alcohol addiction11 and a lifetime
affliction for a child whose mother consumed significant
amounts of alcohol during her pregnancy. The U.S. Surgeon
General urges all “pregnant women and women who may
become pregnant to abstain from alcohol consumption in order

4

Id.
Id. at 2.
6
Id. at 1. “Psychotropic drugs are chemicals that affect the central
nervous system, altering psychological processes (e.g. mood, thoughts,
perception, emotions, behavior).” Psychotropic Drugs—Definition of
Psychotropic Drugs, ABOUT.COM, http://bpd.about.com/od/glossary/g/
psytropic.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
7
Shea, supra note 2, at 1.
8
Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASDs): Facts About FASDs, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/
facts.html (last updated Sept. 22, 2011).
9
Kenneth Lyons Jones & Ann P. Streissguth, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
and Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders: A Brief History, 38 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 373, 377 (2010).
10
See Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASDs): Diagnosis, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/
diagnosis.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter CDC Diagnosis].
11
See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
5
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to eliminate the chance of giving birth to a baby with any of the
harmful effects of the Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders.”12
In recent years, states have used child abuse and neglect
statutes to criminally prosecute women who consume controlled
substances during pregnancy or who give birth to FAS babies.13
This Note argues that incarceration and other criminal sanctions
are ineffective measures to resolve the root of the problem—the
mother’s addiction. Instead, this Note proposes utilizing such
statutes to impose sentences of mandatory postbirth outpatient
rehabilitation, after medical testing determines that the child was
exposed to significant levels of alcohol during the second or
third trimester of pregnancy.14
Part I of this Note provides a medical overview of the causes
and effects of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and discusses why legal
intervention is an appropriate means of deterring future FASrelated births. Part II analyzes the current legal treatment of
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome at both the state and federal level. Part
III compares retributive measures to rehabilitation and argues
that criminal sanctions are an ineffective and constitutionally
questionable approach to confronting addiction in pregnant
women. Part IV examines postbirth rehabilitation models and
proposes scientific testing of a newborn’s meconium15 to
determine whether the mother consumed significant amounts of
12

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Office of the
Surgeon Gen., U.S. Surgeon General Releases Advisory on Alcohol Use in
Pregnancy (Feb. 21, 2005), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
pressreleases/sg02222005.html.
13
See infra Part II.A.
14
This proposal specifically rests upon a mother’s actions during her
second or third trimester of pregnancy, after the fetus has reached viability.
The author in no way intends to deprive pregnant women of their full rights
to timely abortions or for the stated argument to be extended to the abortion
realm. This argument discusses the specific issue of FAS and proposes a
means for addressing the severe medical and social impact of babies born
with the debilitating syndrome. Though this argument, by necessity, enhances
fetal rights to a certain extent, it does so only after the point of viability and
in no way prohibits or diminishes a woman’s constitutional rights to abortion.
15
Meconium is the matter excreted during an infant’s first bowel
movements and is comprised of substances the baby received from its mother
in utero. See infra Part IV and notes 121–23.
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alcohol during the second or third trimesters of pregnancy.
Finally, Part V outlines a proposal for a sentence of mandatory
postbirth outpatient rehabilitation, analyzing the flexibility
provided by such programs against concerns for their potential
constraints upon a woman’s liberty. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that mandatory postbirth outpatient rehabilitation is
justified as an effective treatment approach for a mother’s
alcohol abuse, thus preventing the mother from giving birth to
future FAS babies while creating a safer and more supportive
home environment for an FAS child with special needs.
I. FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME: A MEDICAL OVERVIEW
It is increasingly understood that the formula for predicting
an FAS birth is not quite as simple as was once concluded.16
Early researchers believed that the severity of FAS-related
damage was directly correlated to the quantity of alcohol
consumed by the mother during pregnancy, the frequency with
which she consumed alcohol during pregnancy, and the timing
of drinking during key developmental stages of gestation.17 A
more recent study shows that “as the amount of alcohol
consumed on one day rises, the risk of fetal alcohol
abnormalities also rises: less than one ounce, very little risk; one
to two ounces, 10% risk of abnormalities; five ounces, 50% risk
of abnormalities; and over five ounces, 75% risk of
abnormalities.”18 It is equally clear that frequent consumption of
lower quantities of alcohol is also damaging to the fetus.19
16

Philip A. May & J. Phillip Gossage, Maternal Risk Factors for Fetal
Alcohol Spectrum Disorders: Not As Simple As It Might Seem, 34 ALCOHOL
RES. & HEALTH 15, 16 (2011).
17
Id.
18
Claire E. Dineen, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: The Legal and Social
Responses to Its Impact on Native Americans, 70 N.D. L. REV. 1, 18–19
(1994) (citing Steven R. Hawks, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Implications for
Health Education, 24 J. HEALTH EDUC. 22, 23 (1993) and Claire B. Ernhart
et al., Alcohol Related Birth Defects: Assessing the Risk, 562 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 159, 160 (1989)).
19
See May & Gossage, supra note 16, at 17 (citing studies documenting
that children who were prenatally exposed to alcohol at a mean daily
consumption of more than 0.3 to 0.5 standard drinks per day as averaged
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However, although “as little as one dose of alcohol has been
demonstrated to reduce brain cell adhesion and cause
neurological deficits . . . there is actually little evidence that one
drink or even two a day cause harm” to the severe degree of
FAS.20 These statistics suggest that the highest risk of
abnormalities occurs in infants whose mothers consumed alcohol
consistently and heavily during pregnancy, perhaps engaging in
binge-drinking patterns.21
When a pregnant woman consumes alcohol, the “alcohol
passes through the placenta membrane, causing the fetus’s blood
alcohol content to equal that of the mother.”22 The mother is
able to quickly metabolize the alcohol to eliminate it from her
system, but the fetus lacks this ability and the toxins linger
inside the placenta.23 These toxins “disrupt[] the formation of the
fetus by impairing fetal oxygen supply and disrupting protein

across seven days were deficient in cognitive and behavioral abilities
(including IQ) when compared to children who were not prenatally exposed
to alcohol).
20
Kathryn Page, Fetal Alcohol Spectrum—The Hidden Epidemic in Our
Courts, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 2001, at 21, 22.
21
The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism defines binge
drinking in women as a drinking pattern that brings a woman’s blood alcohol
content to 0.08 grams per 100 grams blood or above, which corresponds to
consuming about four alcoholic drinks or more in a two-hour period.
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Council Approves
Definition of Binge Drinking, NIAAA NEWSLETTER (Nat’l Inst. on Alcohol
Abuse & Alcoholism, Bethesda, Md.), Winter 2004, at 3, 3. “Binge drinking
. . . produces the highest [Blood Alcohol Content (BAC)], and it is the peak
BAC that affects the developing fetus most negatively.” May & Gossage,
supra note 16, at 17 (citations omitted). See also Page, supra note 20, at 22
(“[B]inge-drinkers are the most frequent mothers of FAS children . . . .”).
Dr. Kathryn Page further notes that risk factors like poverty can come into
play in instances of binge drinking because large (often forty-ounce) malt
liquors and other inexpensive intoxicants contain the alcohol level of multiple
drinks for a low price, “so one can [of the alcoholic beverage] qualifies as a
binge and can significantly harm the fetus.” Id.
22
Erin N. Linder, Note, Punishing Prenatal Alcohol Abuse: The
Problems Inherent in Utilizing Civil Commitment to Address Addiction, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 873, 883.
23
Id. (citing Dineen, supra note 18, at 18–19).
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synthesis and hormone production.”24 Additionally, the alcohol is
directly toxic to the “rapidly dividing cells of the developing
fetus” and interferes with nutrient delivery to the growing
fetus.25
Though the dangers of alcohol on fetal development are
apparent, physicians and researchers have struggled to develop
comprehensive diagnostic guidelines for FAS, in part because of
the “lack of clinical expertise among general pediatricians in
diagnosing affected children.”26 As a result, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) does not have a
precise record of how many children are born with FAS.27 CDC
studies on the prevalence of FAS births vary, with results
ranging from 0.2 to 1.5 cases of FAS for every 1,000 live births
to 0.5 to 2.0 cases per 1,000 live births.28 However, the CDC
has noted that, “because of the challenges of establishing
accurate and timely prevalence information, the magnitude could
be even greater than current data indicate.”29 In the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services 2002 Appropriations
Bill, Congress expressed an interest in remedying these
statistical uncertainties to provide for more accurate
accounting.30 Congress mandated that the CDC, along with the
24

Id.
PADDY S. COOK ET AL., ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND OTHER DRUGS
MAY HARM THE UNBORN 15–16 (Tineke B. Haase ed., 1990) (cited in
Dineen, supra note 18, at 18).
26
Jones & Streissguth, supra note 9, at 378.
27
Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASDs): Data & Statistics, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/
data.html (last updated Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter CDC Data & Statistics].
According to 2004 CDC estimates, 1,000 to 6,000 infants will be born with
FAS each year. NAT’L CTR. ON BIRTH DEFECTS & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES ET AL., FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME: GUIDELINES FOR
REFERRAL AND DIAGNOSIS 1 (2004) [hereinafter FAS GUIDELINES].
28
CDC Data & Statistics, supra note 27.
29
FAS GUIDELINES, supra note 27, at 2 (noting a historical failure among
medical care providers to consistently recognize and identify the symptoms of
FAS).
30
See id. at 3–4 (discussing a Congressional mandate that the CDC
develop more structured guidelines and implement those guidelines
systematically).
25
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National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental
Disabilities, the National Task Force on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
and Fetal Alcohol Effect, and other federally funded and
nongovernmental organizations, develop diagnostic guidelines
for FAS.31 These guidelines are based on empirical and clinical
evidence to “allow public health and service professionals to
better determine the impact of FAS, and deliver needed services
to affected children.”32
As a result of this congressional mandate, the medical
community has developed comprehensive diagnostic guidelines
for FAS with the hope that such guidelines will increase the rate
and accuracy of FAS diagnoses.33 The following three criteria
must be present for a diagnosis of FAS: (1) facial dysmorphia;
(2) growth problems; and (3) central nervous system
abnormalities.34
Dysmorphia is a medical term for malformations that occur
when the normal growth and development process is interrupted,
resulting in the abnormal shape, size, or positioning of particular
features.35 Children with FAS exhibit three distinct facial
features: (1) “a smooth ridge between the nose and upper lip”
(medically termed a “smooth philtrum”); (2) “a thin upper lip”;
and (3) a shortened amount of space “between the inner and
outer corners of the eyes,” “giving the eyes a wide-spaced

31

Id.
Id.
33
The Foreword to the Guidelines for Referral and Diagnosis states in
relevant part:
This document represents the deliberations of clinicians, researchers,
parents, and representatives of governmental and non-governmental
organizations, whose main goals were to increase the identification of
individuals with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) using uniform criteria,
and to improve the delivery of appropriate services to those individuals
and their families. These new guidelines will help achieve those goals
by educating medical and allied health professionals about FAS.
Id. at v.
34
Id. at vii–viii.
35
Id. at 9. Alcohol consumption by a pregnant mother can lead to
dysmorphia of the fetus by interfering with fetal nerve cell development and
function. Id.
32
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appearance.”36 To meet the criteria for facial dysmorphia, all
three features must be present.37 Next, the child in question must
have a documented “prenatal or postnatal height or weight, or
both, at or below the 10th percentile, documented at any one
point in time (adjusted for age, sex, gestational age, and race or
ethnicity).”38 Finally, the child must demonstrate central nervous
system abnormalities, which fall into three separate categories—
structural, neurological, and functional.39 Structural problems
include a smaller head circumference than is proportionally
normal for the person’s overall height and weight, typically “at
or below the tenth percentile.”40 Additionally, brain imaging,
such as magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) or computer
tomography scans (“CT scans”), may evidence changes in the
physical structure of the brain.41 Neurological problems “include
poor coordination, poor muscle control, or problems with
sucking as a baby,” which cannot be explained by another
cause.42 Functional disabilities encompass a broad range of
cognitive and social defects that essentially demonstrate that
“[t]he person’s ability to function is well below what’s expected
for his or her age, schooling, or circumstances.”43 Within this
category, a child must show either cognitive deficit in multiple
areas, with performance below the third percentile, or
“significant developmental delay in children who are too young
for an IQ assessment.”44 Additionally, the child must
demonstrate disabilities in at least three of the following areas:
(1) cognitive defects or developmental delays;45 (2) executive
36

CDC Diagnosis, supra note 10.
FAS GUIDELINES, supra note 27, at 9. Other features observed in FAS
patients include cardiac abnormalities, ear abnormalities, overlapping fingers,
joint disabilities, short or webbed neck, and vertebra and rib abnormalities,
among others. Id.
38
Id. at vii.
39
Id. at vii–viii.
40
Id. at vii; CDC Diagnosis, supra note 10.
41
FAS GUIDELINES, supra note 27, at vii; CDC Diagnosis, supra note 10.
42
CDC Diagnosis, supra note 10.
43
Id.
44
Id.; FAS GUIDELINES, supra note 27, at viii.
45
Cognitive defects or developmental delays may include learning
37

PROHIBITION DURING PREGNANCY

163

functioning deficits;46 (3) motor functioning delays;47 (4) attention
problems or hyperactivity;48 (5) problems with social skills;49 and
(6) other problems, including sensitivity to taste or to touch,
difficulty reading facial expressions on others, or difficulty
understanding disciplinary controls.50
A child who is documented to have met all three of the
above criteria—facial dysmorphia, growth problems, and central
nervous system abnormalities—will receive a positive diagnosis
for FAS.51 A mother’s confirmed absence of alcohol ingestion
during pregnancy would, of course, rule out a diagnosis of FAS,
since exposure to alcohol in utero is the only means of
developing FAS.52 However, CDC guidelines state that it is not
necessary to affirmatively confirm the mother’s use of alcohol
during pregnancy if the child meets the standard diagnostic
criteria listed above, as these diagnostic results taken as a whole
conclusively establish the child’s exposure to alcohol in the
womb.53
Beyond the incalculable quality of life costs for children with
FAS and their family members, FAS also brings a hefty
monetary price tag. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
researcher estimates for the cost for treatment and care resulting
from FAS ranged from $250 million to $1.6 billion each year
disabilities, poor grades, slowed movements and reactions, or “performance
differences between verbal and nonverbal skills.” CDC Diagnosis, supra note 10.
46
Executive functioning deficits may include poor organization, poor
planning skills, lack of inhibition, difficulty following instructions with
multiple steps, difficulty understanding the concept of cause-and-effect,
inability to apply existing knowledge to new situations, or poor judgment. Id.
47
Motor functioning delays may include delay in walking, difficulty with
fine motor skills (such as writing or drawing), clumsiness, problems with
balance, or problems with dexterity. Id.
48
Attention problems or hyperactivity may include difficulty calming
down or moving between activities, difficulty paying attention, or easy
distraction. Id.
49
Problems with social skills may include immaturity, inappropriate sexual
behavior, trouble understanding the feelings of others, or fears of strangers. Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See id.
53
See id.
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for an FAS incidence of 1.9 per 1,000 live births.54 In 2002, the
CDC estimated the lifetime cost for one individual with FAS at
$2 million and “the cost to the United States for FAS alone [at]
over $4 billion annually.”55 For those afflicted and for society as
a whole, the negative effects of FAS are clear.
II. FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME IN CURRENT STATE AND
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The two predominant approaches under which prosecutors
have attempted to criminalize the actions of drug-abusing
pregnant women are by utilizing state child endangerment
statutes and by “charging a woman with the ‘delivery’ of a
controlled substance to a ‘child’ via the umbilical cord while in
the womb or a few moments after birth.”56 While these
prosecutorial measures have been used primarily to counter
maternal drug use during pregnancy, they provide valuable
insight into the criminal sanctions facing pregnant women who
suffer with any kind of substance abuse. As this Note proposes,
incrimination is an ineffective solution for mothers battling drug
and alcohol addictions, as well as one that presents additional
obstacles for affected children.
A. Criminal Prosecution Under State Child Endangerment
Statutes
State child endangerment statutes represent one approach
towards the criminal prosecution of drug- or alcohol-abusing
mothers. In 1996, the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Whitner v. State looked to the state’s child endangerment statute
54

Gregory Bloss, The Economic Cost of FAS, 18 ALCOHOL RES. &
HEALTH 53, 53–54 (1994).
55
CDC Data & Statistics, supra note 27 (citing C. Lupton et al., Cost of
Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders, 127C AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART C:
SEMINARS IN MED. GENETICS 42 (2004)).
56
Tony A. Kordus, Comment, Did South Carolina Really Protect the
Fetus by Imposing Criminal Sanctions on a Woman for Ingesting Cocaine
During Her Pregnancy in Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164
(S.C. July 15, 1996)?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 319, 325–26 (1997).
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to affirm the criminal conviction of a mother who damaged her
fetus by ingesting an illegal drug during her pregnancy.57
Moreover, and critical as applied to this Note’s lens of alcohol
consumption during pregnancy, the court did not distinguish
between illegal drugs, like the cocaine ingested by Whitner, and
a legal substance like alcohol.58 The court “articulated that it did
not matter if the action is legal or not, what matters is whether
the ‘life, health or comfort’ of the child is endangered.”59
Indeed, the child neglect statute in Whitner stated that it was a
crime for “[a]ny person having the legal custody of any child
. . . without lawful excuse, to refuse or neglect to provide . . .
proper care and attention for such child.”60 This was the first
time in which a court upheld the conviction of a substanceabusing mother under a child endangerment statute, finding that
a viable fetus was considered a “child” as used in the statute.61
When the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on
the issue presented in Whitner, it “open[ed] the door for other
states to interpret their statutes similarly.”62 However, other
states have proceeded with mixed results in determining whether
to follow South Carolina’s lead. In 2009, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota held that an unborn child is not defined as a
57

See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780–81 (S.C. 1997); see also
Kordus, supra note 56, at 320–21.
58
See Judith A. Jones, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome–Contrary Issues of
Criminal Liability for the Child and His Mother, 24 J. JUV. L. 165, 176
(2003–2004) (citing Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 782).
59
Id. (citing Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 782).
60
Kordus, supra note 56, at 331 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50
(1985) (repealed 2008)).
61
See, e.g., State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Brian C. Spitzer, A Response to “Cocaine Babies”—
Amendment of Florida’s Child Abuse and Neglect Laws to Encompass Infants
Born Drug Dependent, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 881 (1987) (“Criminal
prosecution would needlessly destroy the family by incarcerating the child’s
mother when alternative measures could both protect the child and stabilize
the family.”)); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 712–13 (Ohio 1992) (holding
that the statute in question did not apply to a pregnant woman’s ingestion of a
controlled substance and that it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts,
to impose a statutory duty of care on pregnant women).
62
Linder, supra note 22, at 878.
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“child” under state statutes pertaining to the crime of
endangerment of a child.63 But in August 2011, the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals held that a viable fetus is a “child”
as defined in state criminal statutes prohibiting the chemical
endangerment of a child.64 Because of this interpretation, the
Alabama court upheld the defendant’s sentence of one year of
supervised probation after she tested positive for cocaine prior to
giving birth and her son tested positive for cocaine after his
birth.65 This recent case shows the willingness of state courts to
impose criminal sanctions on women whose drug or alcohol use
causes harm to the fetus in utero, though such sanctions do not
necessarily result in imprisonment.
B. Criminal Prosecution for the Delivery of a Controlled
Substance to a Child
Prosecutors have also attempted to convict a woman for
substance use during pregnancy by charging her with the
delivery of a controlled substance to a child.66 In Johnson v.
State, prosecutors argued that the defendant, Ms. Johnson,
“delivered cocaine . . . to her two children via blood flowing
through the children’s umbilical cords” during the time in which
the children were no longer in utero, but still attached to the
defendant by their umbilical cords.67 The defendant had
previously delivered a son who tested positive for cocaine after
his birth.68 While pregnant with her second child, the defendant
overdosed on crack cocaine and admitted to using while she was
in labor.69 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the term “delivery” in the statute at issue did not apply to a
70
mother who had ingested illegal drugs during her pregnancy.
63

State v. Geiser, 763 N.W.2d 469, 473–74 (N.D. 2009).
Ankrom v. State, No. CR-09-1148, 2011 WL 3781258, at *8 (Ala.
Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2011).
65
Id. at *1.
66
See Kordus, supra note 56, at 325–27.
67
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290–91 (Fla. 1992).
68
Id. at 1291.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1296.
64
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In holding that the statute as written did not apply to Ms.
Johnson’s case, the court reasoned that if the legislature intended
to address the problem of mothers passing illicit substances to a
fetus in utero, the statute should be redrafted.71 Furthermore, the
court observed that prosecuting women for using drugs and
“delivering” them in utero to their babies might prompt
substance-abusing pregnant women to avoid appropriate prenatal
or medical care for fear of prosecution.72 Clearly, this outcome
would be counterproductive to the public interest goal of
encouraging proper medical care for pregnant women and their
babies and could increase potential medical risks to both the
mother and the baby if the mother withholds critical information
from her doctors for fear of criminal punishment.73
III. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN REACHING THE ROOT OF
THE PROBLEM
Unfortunately, it seems an impossible feat for any system,
legal, medical, or otherwise, to prevent all alcohol consumption
during pregnancy.74 However, while “the causes of most birth
defects [are] unknown,”75 a woman’s ingestion of alcohol during
pregnancy is the clear cause of FAS, thus establishing a causal
71

Id.
Id. at 1295–96.
73
See id. at 1296; see also Tiffany Lyttle, Note, Stop the Injustice: A
Protest Against the Unconstitutional Punishment of Pregnant Drug-Addicted
Women, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 781, 790–91 (2006) (arguing that
the criminal prosecution of substance-abusing pregnant women could result in
a loss of trust between the patient and her doctors, potentially jeopardizing
the health of the fetus if the woman hesitates to provide her doctor with
accurate information about her pregnancy).
74
Page, supra note 20, at 22 (“In spite of hard evidence for the
widespread damage that prenatal exposure to alcohol causes, drinking during
pregnancy persists. Part of this is caused by physicians who will say that a
drink or two doesn’t hurt; part is caused by conditions of living that beg to be
softened by a little daily oblivion; part is caused by cognitive impairment
(including not being aware that one is pregnant), and part is caused by
addiction.”).
75
Adolfo Correa et al., Diabetes Mellitus and Birth Defects, 199 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 237.e1, 237.e1 (2008).
72
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link between the mother’s actions and the resulting harm to the
child.76 In fact, “[a]lcohol now is recognized as the leading
preventable cause of birth defects and developmental disorders
in the United States.”77 To stop the spread of harm and prevent
future FAS births, the legal system must address the pregnant
mothers’ own issues. Furthermore, the direct cause-and-effect
link between a mother’s alcohol consumption and the resulting
harm to the fetus makes FAS an appropriate disease for legal
intervention because of the scientific ability to determine
whether the mother’s actions caused harm to her unborn child
and, if so, to treat the mother accordingly.78
By providing the necessary treatment for alcohol-dependent
women, or women with alcoholic tendencies, the legal system
can prevent the uptick of future FAS births, as well as ensure a
healthier and more stable home environment for FAS-afflicted
children. The challenge remains in designing a solution that
effectively balances the interest in protecting the health and wellbeing of all parties involved—pregnant women, unborn children,
and society at large—and the interest in safeguarding the legal
and constitutional rights of pregnant women.
At the heart of the justice system is the concept that criminal
behavior may be punished through retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrence, or a combination of two or more of these theories.79
Behind the theory of retribution is the idea that “[s]ociety is
entitled to impose . . . sanctions . . . to express its
condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral
imbalance caused by the offense.”80 Indeed, “incarceration is
widely assumed to be the legal punishment of choice.”81 But in
76

See, e.g., Dineen, supra note 18, at 2 (“[FAS is] a condition with
only one cause: maternal drinking during pregnancy.”).
77
Kenneth R. Warren et al., Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders: Research
Challenges and Opportunities, 34 J. NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM 1, 4 (2001).
78
“[T]he real tragedy is that FAS is a completely preventable
condition . . . .” Dineen, supra note 18, at 11.
79
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008).
80
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
81
Richard L. Lippke, Retribution and Incarceration, 17 PUB. AFF. Q.
29, 29 (2003).
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imposing a proper sentence, courts may also consider the
defendant’s rehabilitative needs.82 This Note advocates for a
rehabilitation-focused method over retribution, as it deters future
FAS births rather than imposing after-the-fact sanctions.
A. The Retribution Model
The imposition of criminal sanctions raises issues of due
process notice, specifically, whether women who abuse alcohol
during their pregnancies have the appropriate mens rea to
commit a crime.83 Professor Jean Reith Schroedel, whose
publications include the book, Is the Fetus a Person? A
Comparison of Policies Across the Fifty States, noted that the
mens rea for cases involving child abuse prosecutions for
substance abuse during pregnancy typically “entails either
‘objective’ evidence of recklessness and/or negligence or
‘subjective’ intent with purposeful and knowing action.”84
Alcohol is a unique substance for abuse and for statutory
regulation because its use is legal by persons over twenty-one
years of age, unlike drugs, such as cocaine, which are generally
illegal regardless of whether the user is pregnant or not.85
82

See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2011) (stating that rehabilitation
is considered “one purpose of sentencing” and that rehabilitation must be
“balanced and considered along with the other goals of punishment, such as
protecting the community”).
83
Jan L. Holmgren, Legal Accountability and Fetal Alcohol Syndrome:
When Fixing the Blame Doesn’t Fix the Problem, 36 S.D. L. REV. 81, 101
(1991) (“Due process requires reasonable notice that the act in question
constitutes a crime.”).
84
Jean Reith Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health
Oriented Responses to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 217, 218 (2001).
85
See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997) (stating that
Whitner’s use of crack cocaine during pregnancy does not implicate any
fundamental right of Whitner’s because “[u]se of crack cocaine is illegal,
period” and a user’s status as a pregnant woman does not “elevate[] the use of
crack cocaine to the lofty status of a fundamental right”); see also Linder,
supra note 22, at 892 (arguing that statutes “prohibiting prenatal alcohol abuse
pose procedural due process problems, as they regulate an otherwise legal
activity”).
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Accordingly, Linder argues that “[s]tatutes that punish pregnant
women for drinking alcohol fail to afford defendants fair notice
because ordinary persons will usually not consider the
consumption of alcohol an activity giving rise to punitive
sanctions,” with the exception of statutes that criminalize acts
like “drunk driving or public intoxication.”86
On the other hand, the absence of fair notice argument is
weakened by widespread media coverage about the births of
“crack babies,” which brings to the forefront the harmful effects
of drug use on fetuses.87 Major institutions like the CDC, the
March of Dimes, the Office of the Surgeon General, and the
National Institutes of Health outline the risks of alcohol use
during pregnancy on their websites and in pamphlet materials,
asserting that no amount of alcohol is safe to consume during
pregnancy.88 Additionally, though it is impossible to determine
whether every doctor or clinic in the country does so, physicians
presumably inform pregnant women during prenatal visits that it
is unsafe to consume alcohol during pregnancy.89
The Wisconsin state legislature took an assertive and
contentious stance on fetal rights with the enactment of a state
statute that permits law enforcement officials to take a pregnant
adult mother into police custody when there is a “substantial
risk” that the “the child, when born, will be seriously affected
or endangered” due to the mother’s inability to control her
86

Linder, supra note 22, at 892.
See Lyttle, supra note 73, at 792.
88
Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASDs): Alcohol Use in Pregnancy,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/
fasd/alcohol-use.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2010) (“CDC urges pregnant
women not to drink alcohol any time during pregnancy.”); Pregnancy: Alcohol
and Drugs, MARCH OF DIMES, http://www.marchofdimes.com/pregnancy/
alcohol_indepth.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (“Drinking alcohol during
pregnancy can cause permanent harm to your baby. But the good news is that
these harmful conditions can be completely avoided. If you stay away from
alcohol during pregnancy, your baby can’t have FASDs or any other health
conditions caused by alcohol.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs. Office of the Surgeon Gen., supra note 12 (“We do not know
what, if any, amount of alcohol is safe . . . . It’s in the child’s best interest for
a pregnant woman to simply not drink alcohol.”).
89
See supra Part II.A.
87
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alcohol consumption during the pregnancy.90 The controversial
statutory scheme has been criticized as a “draconian approach to
protecting fetal rights.”91 Some scholarly critics argue that
“[p]unitive regulations which subject pregnant women to
involuntary civil commitment violate the substantive rights of
privacy and bodily integrity afforded by the Due Process
Clause”92 and that “Wisconsin’s regime seems to be an effective
solution to prenatal alcohol exposure, [but] the use of coercive
legislative tactics is inherently flawed.”93 Focusing on measures
designed to decrease the chance, or severity, of harm to the
fetus is, of course, a noble goal. But even the most virtuous
intentions must be viewed in light of the affected party’s
constitutional rights.
Even if a woman knows that consuming alcohol during
pregnancy is unsafe, she still may not possess the necessary mens
rea to commit a criminal act. For instance, she may be unaware
of her pregnancy and thus continue to consume alcohol during the
critical first months of pregnancy.94 Even if the mother is aware
of her pregnancy, she may not be acting with intent to harm, but
rather an addiction may cause her to lack the voluntary control to
curb her alcohol use.95 Once viewed under the so-called “sin
90

WIS. STAT. § 48.193(1)(d)(2) (2012). An expectant mother may also
be taken into police custody under a valid warrant, id. § 48.193(1)(a), or by
an order of the judge if the expectant mother’s “habitual lack of self-control
in the use of alcohol beverages” is satisfactorily shown to the judge and
presents a substantial risk of harm to the unborn child, id. § 48.193(c).
91
Linder, supra note 22, at 882.
92
Id. at 889; see also Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse
Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction Over Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
989, 1020–22 (1998) (arguing that such statutes often invoke constitutional
problems of notice and vagueness, as well as the due process right to
privacy).
93
Linder, supra note 22, at 874.
94
See Linder, supra note 22, at 883 (“Significantly, many women do not
even realize they are pregnant during this initial stage when the fetus is most
vulnerable to the toxic effects of alcohol exposure.” (citations omitted)).
95
See Michael A. Hammer, Comment, The Constitutional, Judicial and
Social Pitfalls Attendant to the Criminalization of Prenatal Maternal
Substance Abuse: A Plea for Governmental Uniformity and Mercy, 22 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1456, 1484–85 (1992).
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model,”96 alcoholism, beginning in the early 1960s, was
conceptualized under the “disease model,” which “posited that
alcohol abuse was generally outside of the individual’s control
and demonstrated neither immorality nor weakness of
character.”97 Because an alcohol-addicted individual cannot
control his or her drinking, this model holds that “an alcoholic
simply cannot have the requisite mens rea to be criminally
liable . . . .”98
Tied to the absence of mens rea is the notion that alcoholic
mothers may lack the personal culpability that generally
motivates criminal sanctions. In 2011, the Supreme Court
declared that “the heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender.”99 This principle becomes
particularly relevant when applied to individuals suffering from
drug and alcohol addiction, whose personal culpability in
committing a criminal act may be lessened as a result of their
addictions. At its root, a retributive system simply ignores the
fact that many women who give birth to a baby with FAS are
not reckless criminals100 but women in need of substance abuse
treatment.101
96

Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1661
(1981) (describing the “sin model” of alcoholism as the view that “alcohol
abuse, however severe, was both willful and culpable, a sign of moral
weakness at best, of dissolute immortality at worst”). “The ‘sinful’ alcoholic
was thought capable of reforming himself through the mere exertion of will.”
Id. at 1661–62.
97
Id. at 1662.
98
Hammer, supra note 95, at 1491–92 (referencing the court’s findings
as to public drunkenness in Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50
(D.C. Cir. 1966)).
99
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (quoting Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1986)).
100
In State v. McKnight, the court expanded its definition of criminal
recklessness by interpreting reckless disregard for the safety of others as “a
conscious failure to exercise due care of ordinary care or a conscious indifference
to the rights and safety of others or a reckless disregard thereof” and concluded
that McKnight “had demonstrated the requisite criminal intent” by smoking crack
cocaine during her pregnancy because she should have known the dangers it
presented to her fetus. Shalini Bhargava, Note, Challenging Punishment and
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B. The Rehabilitation Model
While incarceration largely ignores the role a mother’s
addiction may play in FAS, rehabilitative responses such as
alcohol treatment programs focus on treating the soon-to-be
mother, which in turn promotes the health of the fetus. Effective
alcohol-abuse treatment also ensures that a mother is capable of
parenting a child with FAS.102 Dr. Kathryn Page, a clinical
psychologist who has devoted her career to the study of fetal
alcohol spectrum disorders, has perceived significant selfreporting of depression and anxiety among parents raising an
FAS child and has noted that drug and alcohol abuse are likely
to “begin or increase under the confusion, pressure, and shame”
of raising the afflicted child.103 Thus, an alcohol-addicted woman
parenting a child with FAS may find that she is trapped in a
vicious cycle, with her alcohol consumption increasing under the
stress of raising an FAS child, thus making parenting even more
trying. It is therefore crucial for an alcohol-addicted woman to
receive treatment for her substance abuse before taking on such
a challenge.104
Privatization: A Response to the Conviction of Regina McKnight, 39 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 520 (2004) (citing State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168,
173 (S.C. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (referencing statistical
data that indicates that the severity of harm to the fetus increases with the
amount of alcohol a pregnant woman consumes in a single day, suggesting
that alcohol-dependent women give birth to babies with more severe defects
than women who consume smaller quantities of alcohol in a given sitting).
102
“Children with prenatal alcohol exposure are difficult for anyone to
raise . . . .” Page, supra note 20, at 29.
103
Id.; see also About Kathryn Page, FETAL ALCOHOL TEAMWORK,
CONSULTATION AND TRAINING, http://fatcat.vpweb.com/About-KathrynPage.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012) (discussing Dr. Page’s background).
104
“The law must take the position that, if a woman is incapable of
meeting her maternal calling, then it is incumbent upon the state to recognize
its own moral duty by providing accessible treatment and educational
opportunities that do not focus on criminalizing behavior.” Caroline S.
Palmer, The Risks of State Intervention in Preventing Prenatal Alcohol Abuse
and the Viability of an Inclusive Approach: Arguments for Limiting Punitive
and Coercive Prenatal Alcohol Abuse Legislation in Minnesota, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 287, 307 (1999).
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Current rehabilitative approaches tend to focus on prebirth
enforcement measures designed to lessen the intensity of harm to
the fetus. Determining that a pregnant woman has been drinking
alcohol and preventing further alcohol abuse during the
pregnancy could lessen the intensity of harm to the fetus,
depending in part on how and when the alcohol was
consumed.105 However, there are a number of potential problems
with these types of prebirth rehabilitation models. For instance,
a pregnant woman “may not report her alcohol consumption
accurately because she is embarrassed or afraid to admit to
drinking while pregnant,”106 thus making it difficult for medical
practitioners to accurately identify the risk her alcohol
consumption poses to her fetus. Even if an alcohol-dependent
woman is identified, in actuality many prebirth measures focus
less on rehabilitation and more on criminal prosecution107 or civil
commitment.
One problem inherent in prebirth initiatives is that they
command legal action before it has been revealed whether the
mother’s alcohol consumption has even caused any harm to her
fetus. Additionally, these proposals are rife with logistical
pitfalls. Though lessening harm to the fetus is the goal of
prebirth rehabilitation measures, finding such treatment centers
may prove difficult. Studies show that “[t]he insufficient number
of treatment programs that will accept pregnant women is a
national problem.”108 Indeed, “the few drug treatment programs
105

See Dineen, supra note 18, at 20–21 (noting both that “infants of
women who stop drinking early in their pregnancy exhibit less severe effects,
such as less growth retardation, than women who continue to drink excessive
amounts” and that “[g]estational timing of the prenatal alcohol exposure is an
important factor in understanding the effects on the fetus”).
106
Screening for Alcohol Use and Alcohol-Related Problems, ALCOHOL
ALERT (U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. et al., Rockville, Md.), no.
65, Apr. 2005, at 1, 5. Because many women will alter their answers during
pregnancy or may have consumed harmful amounts of alcohol prior to
learning of their pregnancies, the National Institutes of Health and the
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism suggest that asking a
woman about her drinking patterns before she becomes pregnant would solicit
more accurate measures of her first-trimester alcohol consumption. See id. at 3.
107
See supra Parts II.A–B.
108
Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers:
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that can handle the diverse mental, physical, and emotional
needs of pregnant drug-addicted women usually have long
waiting lists, [and] are understaffed.”109 Thus, prebirth measures
are not only logistically faulty, but may toe dangerous
constitutional lines as well.
IV. MERITS OF POSTBIRTH REHABILITATION
While proponents of prebirth rehabilitation may criticize
postbirth measures as too little too late,110 postbirth treatment
actually serves to protect an alcohol-dependent mother’s future
children and to provide the mother’s existing FAS child or
children with a supportive parenting environment.111 A medical
study of FAS confirmed that “women who have had one definite
FAS child, and who continue to drink, have progressively more
severely affected children with subsequent pregnancies.”112 This
is because the severity of damage to the fetus depends on both a
woman’s age and the number of times she has given birth.113
Additionally, alcohol treatment at any point increases the
likelihood of a stable home environment, which is especially
important for parents of special-needs children, who may require
more attention and assistance.114 Thus, there is a strong incentive
to mandate alcohol rehabilitation for mothers even after their

A Problem That Won’t Go Away, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 623, 637 (1994).
109
Lyttle, supra note 73, at 810 (citing Philip H. Jos et al., Substance
Abuse During Pregnancy: Clinical and Public Health Approaches, 31 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 340, 343 (2003)).
110
See supra Part I for a medical overview of the effects of Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome.
111
See supra notes 102–04.
112
INST. OF MED., DIV. OF BIOBEHAVIORAL SCI. & MENTAL DISORDERS,
COMM. TO STUDY FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME, FETAL ALCOHOL
SYNDROME: DIAGNOSIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY, PREVENTION, AND TREATMENT 136
(Kathleen Stratton, Cynthia Howe & Frederick Battaglia eds., 1996) (internal
citations omitted).
113
Id. The effect of the mother’s age on the pregnancy “might, in part,
be related to length of time of alcohol abuse and the consequent liver
damage.” Id. at 137.
114
See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
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babies are born to prevent future FAS births and to counsel
mothers on raising FAS children.
To justify the imposition of mandatory rehabilitation, the
court must first find a suitable method of confirming that the
newborn was exposed to alcohol in utero. While the telltale
facial features of a child with FAS are often immediately clear
at birth, growth problems and central nervous system
abnormalities may not become apparent until the child’s
development is underway.115 Therefore, a more immediate test is
needed to determine whether newborn infants have been exposed
to dangerous levels of alcohol in utero.
Meconium testing provides scientific accuracy in verifying in
utero exposure to alcohol within the constitutional limits of a
woman’s rights. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, S.C., the
Fourth Circuit held that it is constitutional to test a newborn
infant’s bodily fluids.116 Ellen Knight, one of the appellants in
Ferguson, was arrested after her newborn baby’s urine tested
positive for cocaine.117 The court noted that diagnostic searches
of a mother’s urine are unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, unless the search is authorized by a valid
warrant.118 However, the Fourth Circuit wrote that it was “aware
of no decision holding, or even suggesting, that a mother has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her newborn child’s bodily
fluids. Indeed, such a holding would conflict with the general
rule that an expectation of privacy does not arise from one’s
relationship to the person searched.”119 Because only searches
performed on the mothers’ urine were considered by the
Supreme Court on appeal, this holding remains intact. Thus, it
is constitutional to test a newborn’s bodily fluids for evidence of
alcohol exposure in utero.
From a scientific standpoint, meconium provides doctors
with an unrivaled means of determining whether a mother
115
116

See supra notes 36–51 and accompanying text.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, S.C., 308 F.3d 380, 395 (4th Cir.

2002).
117

Id. at 390. The charges against Knight were dismissed after she
successfully completed a drug treatment program. Id.
118
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 68 (2001).
119
Ferguson, 308 F.3d at 395–96.
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consumed harmful amounts of alcohol during pregnancy.120
Meconium is the matter excreted during a baby’s first bowel
movements.121 It “concentrates all substances received from the
mother during gestation.”122 Scientific studies have tested
meconium to measure concentrations of fatty acid ethyl esters
(“FAEEs”), which develop when the mother’s body metabolizes
the ethanol contained in alcohol.123 “Meconium testing for
FAEEs serves as an objective biomarker of prenatal alcohol
exposure and confirms the answers with a biological marker.”124
“Traditionally, samples of neonatal or maternal urine and
blood have been used to determine prenatal alcohol use.”125
However, these samples are mainly capable of reflecting alcohol
exposure “only in the [two] to [three] days before delivery.”126
Additionally, “neonatal urine is difficult to collect, and blood
collection for a neonate is an invasive procedure.”127 Meconium,
on the other hand, can be collected “directly from the infant’s
diaper” and indicates when the fetus was exposed to alcohol.128
“Meconium begins to form as early as the thirteenth week of
pregnancy and continues to accumulate thereafter.”129 Low levels
of FAEEs are found in meconium samples of the general
120

As of September 2012, not a single case was found in which a mother
brought suit for the testing of her child’s meconium.
121
Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1982).
122
Raquel Magri et al., Advances in the Determination of Alcohol and
Other Drug Consumption During Pregnancy: A Study of 900 Births in
Montevideo, Uruguay, 34 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 445, 460 (2007); see also
Haught, 681 F.2d at 294 n.1 (noting that meconium is composed of the
contents “accumulated during the fetus’s gestation”).
123
See Magri et al., supra note 122, at 458. See also Cynthia F. Bearer
et al., Biomarkers of Alcohol Use in Pregnancy, 28 ALCOHOL RES. &
HEALTH 38, 39, 41 (2004), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/
publications/arh28-1/38-43.pdf (internal citations omitted) (“Fatty acid ethyl
esters are metabolic products that result from the interaction between alcohol
and fatty acids.”).
124
Magri et al., supra note 122, at 458.
125
Bearer et al., supra note 123, at 39.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See id.
129
See id.
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population; therefore, “[a] positive test for FAEEs in meconium
means that the mother consumed alcohol in the second and/or
third trimester.”130
The time period made available for analysis using meconium
testing respects a woman’s constitutional rights as established in
Roe v. Wade and affirmed in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. In Roe v. Wade,131 the
Supreme Court determined that before the fetus has reached
viability, “the State’s interests are not strong enough to support
a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”132
Thus, a state may not interfere with a woman’s constitutional
right to make decisions regarding her fetus before the fetus has
reached viability.133 However, States have the right to legally
constrain such decisions after the point of viability, and
individual states can determine whether or not their state
statutory definitions of “personhood” include viable fetuses.134
Therefore, governmental measures directed towards the
development of a fetus in utero must be mindful of the point at
which the fetus reaches viability. Because meconium does not
begin to accumulate until approximately the thirteenth week of
pregnancy, it does not contain evidence of prenatal alcohol
consumption from the first trimester of a woman’s pregnancy.
Importantly, since the mother’s first trimester actions are not
available for analysis, meconium testing respects the central
holdings of Roe and Casey that a state’s interests in a fetus that
has not yet reached viability are not strong enough to justify
government action.
In sum, a positive test for FAEEs in meconium provides
affirmative evidence that the mother consumed three or more
alcoholic drinks per month during the second or third trimesters
of her pregnancy, after the fetus had reached viability, and that
she likely consumed the alcohol in larger quantities on a single
130
131
132
133
134

Magri et al., supra note 122, at 459.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
Id.
Linder, supra note 22, at 876.
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occasion as opposed to in smaller quantities throughout each
month.135 A 2003 scientific study showed that “FAEE
concentration in meconium was more strongly related to the
mother’s self-reported alcohol consumption per occasion than to
the overall average she consumed per week.”136 This makes
meconium testing an especially helpful indicator of fetal harm
because it correlates to the scientific research referenced supra
in Part I, that binge drinking is “the most damaging form of
alcohol consumption on fetal development.”137 Indeed, it appears
that fewer than three drinks per month will not result in a
positive FAEE meconium test.138 Additionally, meconium testing
resolves the issue of notice during the early weeks of a woman’s
pregnancy,139 when a woman may consume alcohol before
realizing that she is pregnant. Presumably, most women would
recognize their pregnancies by the thirteen-week point, so the
issue of notice is largely moot within the scope of this Note.
V. PROPOSAL: MANDATORY POSTBIRTH REHABILITATION
Forty-eight of the fifty states specifically require physicians,
nurses, and various other health and medical practitioners to
report instances of child abuse and neglect, while the remaining
two states require all individuals to report instances of suspected
or observed child abuse.140 Statutory standards typically state that
135

It should be noted that the “correlation between FAEEs in meconium
and prenatal alcohol use is not perfect.” Bearer et al., supra note 123, at 42.
Possible reasons for this include the fact that “genetically determined
variations in alcohol metabolism may influence the synthesis of FAEEs” and
that “illness or the use of some medications and food additives may affect
FAEE concentrations.” Id.
136
Id. at 41 (citing Cynthia F. Bearer et al., Validation of a New
Biomarker of Fetal Exposure to Alcohol, 143 J. PEDIATRICS 463 (2003)).
137
May & Gossage, supra note 16, at 17 (citing E.L. Abel, Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome in Families, 10 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 1, 1–
2 (1998)).
138
See Magri et al., supra note 122, at 459.
139
See supra Part III.A (discussing the issue of whether pregnant woman
who abuse alcohol have the appropriate mens rea to commit a crime).
140
See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS, available at
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a report must be made when the reporter has reasonable cause to
suspect that the child has suffered harm as a result of abuse or
neglect.141 This Note proposes that health practitioners who
suspect that a mother may have consumed alcohol throughout
her pregnancy test the FAEE concentration in the newborn
baby’s meconium to determine whether the baby was exposed to
alcohol in utero during the second or third trimesters of the
mother’s pregnancy. If the infant’s meconium tests positive for
such alcohol exposure, its mother will be issued a citation to
appear before a state court judge and sentenced to mandatory
outpatient rehabilitation.
A. Mandatory Meconium Testing
Some state statues explicitly recognize the need to address
prenatal exposure to alcohol. Kentucky is considering proposed
legislation that expressly authorizes “[a]ny physician or person
legally permitted to engage in attendance upon a pregnant
woman” to conduct a toxicology test “to determine whether
there is evidence of prenatal exposure to alcohol . . . if the
attending person has reason to believe, based on a medical
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf
(listing the mandatory reporters under the state child abuse and neglect
statutes of each of the fifty states). While most states specifically identify
physicians and licensed nurses as mandatory reporters, other states define this
category more broadly as health practitioners generally. See, e.g., IOWA
CODE § 232.69 (2011) (mandating reporting by “every health practitioner
who in the scope of professional practice, examines, attends, or treats a
child”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704 (West 2006) (mandating
reporting by “each health practitioner . . . acting in a professional capacity in
[the] State”). The New Jersey statute states that “[a]ny person having
reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or
acts of child abuse shall report the same immediately,” N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:6-8.10 (West 2012), and the Wyoming statute states that “[a]ny person who
knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a child has been
abused or neglected or who observes any child being subjected to conditions
or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse or neglect, shall
immediately report it . . . or cause a report to be made.” WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-3-205(a) (West 2005).
141
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3620 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304 (2012).
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assessment of the mother or the infant, that the mother used any
such substance . . . during the pregnancy.”142 Likewise, a
Minnesota statute requires:
A physician shall administer to each newborn infant born
under the physician’s care a toxicology test to determine
whether there is evidence of prenatal exposure to a
controlled substance, if the physician has reason to
believe based on a medical assessment of the mother or
the infant that the mother used a controlled substance for
a nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy.143
This Note proposes that if the newborn’s meconium sample tests
positive for FAEE concentration, thus indicating that the
newborn was exposed to high doses of alcohol after reaching
viability, the health care practitioner should report an instance of
child abuse or neglect under the applicable state statute.
It is at the discretion of individual states to determine whether
their state statutory definition of a “child” includes a viable
fetus.144 Some states expressly include alcohol-exposed newborns
in this category. For example, a Missouri state statute authorizes
“any physician or health care provider” to report instances where
a child has been exposed to alcohol, “as evidenced by . . .
[m]edical documentation of signs and symptoms consistent with
. . . alcohol exposure in the child at birth” or “[r]esults of a
confirmed toxicology test . . . performed at birth on the mother
or the child,” along with “[a] written assessment . . . which
documents the child as being at risk of abuse or neglect.”145
Furthermore, a Utah state statute mandates that any person who
attends the birth of a child or cares for a child and “determines
that the child, at the time of birth, has fetal alcohol syndrome . . .
146
shall report that determination . . . as soon as possible.”
Additionally, Indiana has passed legislation to include a child who

142
143
144
145
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H.B. 131, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011).
MINN. STAT. § 626.5562 (2011).
See supra Part II.A.
MO. REV. STAT. § 191.737 (2011).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-404 (LexisNexis 2012).
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is born with FAS within the category of “a child in need of
services.”147
B. Mandatory Outpatient Rehabilitation
Unlike the criminal prosecutions described supra in Part II,
the reporting under this proposal would not be used as
prosecutorial evidence for criminal sanctions. Rather than
arresting the mother, this Note proposes that mothers whose
newborn children are born with FAS are issued a citation to
appear before a state court judge and sentenced to mandatory
outpatient rehabilitation to confront their addiction problems.
Though the ultimate object of this proposition is to provide
alcohol-dependent mothers with treatment to prevent future FAS
births, such a proposal must also consider the best interests of
the FAS child and the mother’s other children, if any. Intensive
inpatient treatment is clinically necessary in certain instances,148
but should be avoided if possible, as it separates the mother
from her newborn child and creates issues of its own.
“Attachment is the social and emotional relationship children
develop with the significant people in their lives. An infant’s
first attachment is usually formed with its mother . . . .”149 The
147

IND. CODE § 31-34-1-10 (2012). This puts children born with FAS in
the same category as children who are victims of more traditional forms of
abuse, including sex abuse, and children whose “physical or mental health is
seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child’s
parent, guardian, or custodian.” See id. § 31-34-1-2; see also In re
Crawford, No. 1998CA00194, 1999 WL 100377 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 1,
1999) (holding that a newborn baby is “neglected” under the state’s neglected
child statutes who tests positive for drug exposure in utero and whose mother
admits to alcohol use during her pregnancy).
148
“[I]npatient care remains more appropriate for patients with serious
concurring medical or psychiatric conditions or in social environments that
are not supportive of recovery.” Nat’l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism,
Research Refines Alcoholism Treatment Options, 24 ALCOHOL RES. &
HEALTH 53, 53 (2000).
149
Effects of Attachment and Separation, CHILD. SERVICES PRAC. NOTES
(N.C. Div. of Soc. Servs. & the Family & Child. Res. Program, Chapel
Hill, N.C.), July 1997, at 1, available at http://www.practicenotes.org/vol2_
no4/cspnv2_4.pdf.
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attachment process begins at birth and helps the child to
“develop intellectually, organize perceptions, think logically,
develop a conscience, become self-reliant, develop coping
mechanisms, . . . and form healthy and intimate relationships”
through continuous interaction with his or her primary
caregiver.150 Separation is the removal of a child from the
caregiver to whom he or she is attached and can interfere with
the child’s ability to develop psychologically healthy
attachments.151
Because children with FAS are already prone to impaired
executive functioning and cognitive and social defects,152 the
added consequences of poor attachment may be especially
detrimental.153 Therefore, for the sake of the child, as well as
any other children the mother may already have at home,
outpatient rehabilitation should be the preferred treatment
method
whenever
possible.154
Furthermore,
outpatient
rehabilitation allows the mother to maintain independence and
daily freedom, thus differentiating it from traditional forms of
retributive punishment and incarceration.155 To mandate inpatient
treatment for all women would support the same principles as
incarceration, simply disguised in a different form.
1. The Effect of Mandatory Rehabilitation on a Woman’s
Constitutional Liberty Rights
Proposing mandatory outpatient rehabilitation necessarily
raises liberty concerns. In Dow v. Circuit Court (Huddy), the
150

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2–3.
152
See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. See generally supra
Part I (discussing the causes and effects of FAS).
153
“[P]oor infant-mother attachment can result in childhood mood
disorders and learning difficulties” and can put children at “higher risk for
substance abuse and delinquent behavior in their teenage years.” Effects of
Attachment and Separation, supra note 149, at 4.
154
Additionally, “escalating health care costs have propelled a shift from
inpatient to outpatient treatment at all stages of recovery.” Nat’l Inst. on
Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism, supra note 148, at 53.
155
See supra Part III.B.
151
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Ninth Circuit examined whether fourteen hours of attendance at
an alcohol rehabilitation program amounted to “custody” under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which permits a person held in custody to
invoke federal habeas corpus review.156 The appellant, Dow, was
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sentenced
to fourteen hours of attendance at an alcohol rehabilitation
program, which could be scheduled by the appellant to take place
over either a three- or five-day period.157 The Ninth Circuit noted
that “requiring appellant’s physical presence at a particular place
. . . significantly restrains appellant’s liberty to do those things
which free persons in the United States are entitled to do and
therefore must be characterized, for jurisdictional purposes, as
custody.”158 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit determined that
mandatory class attendance, such as alcohol rehabilitation, permits
a person to invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction because he
or she is deemed to be “in custody” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a).159
Court-ordered alcohol rehabilitation is not uncommon. Many
state statutes involving driving while under the influence of
alcohol require offenders to attend alcohol rehabilitation programs
and other rehabilitation as the court deems necessary.160 Numerous
156

Dow v. Circuit Court (Huddy), 995 F.2d 922, 922–23 (9th Cir. 1993).
“Habeas corpus” is defined as “a writ requiring a person under arrest to be
brought before a judge or into court, especially to secure the person’s release
unless lawful grounds are shown for their detention.” Habeas Corpus, OXFORD
DICTIONARIES (Apr. 2010), http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/
habeas%2Bcorpus?q=habeas+corpus.
157
Dow, 995 F.2d at 922–23.
158
Id. at 923 (internal quotations omitted).
159
Id.
160
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2012). See also ALA. CODE § 32-5A191 (2010) (ordering the Department of Public Safety not to reissue a driver’s
license to a person convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol
without receiving proof that such person successfully completed a mandatory
DUI or substance abuse court referral program); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1196 (McKinney 2011) (permitting persons convicted of alcohol or drugrelated traffic offenses to participate in “at least fifteen hours” of an alcohol
and drug rehabilitation program within the Department of Motor Vehicles,
the satisfactory completion of which “shall result in the termination of any
sentence of imprisonment that may have been imposed . . . .”).
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outpatient alcohol treatment programs exist throughout the
country, from local community groups to nationwide treatment
providers. Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) is arguably the most
well-known outpatient alcohol treatment program, with an
estimated 113,000 meeting groups throughout the world as of
2007,161 including groups in all fifty states and throughout
Canada.162 According to a 2007 survey of more than 8,000
American and Canadian AA members, eleven percent were
introduced to AA by court order,163 evidencing the prevalence of
court-mandated alcohol rehabilitation. The incidence of AA court
mandates suggests the efficacy of the AA model in achieving such
directives.
Outpatient alcohol addiction groups such as AA require a
relatively minimal time commitment when measured against the
commitment that was upheld as constitutionally appropriate in
Dow. The state court in Dow ordered appellant Dow to attend
fourteen hours of rehabilitation over a three- or five-day period,
which amounted to a minimum daily commitment of 2.8 hours
per day. In contrast, the average AA meeting lasts only about
one hour.164 The court in Dow noted that “to satisfy the custody
requirement, petitioner must demonstrate that [he or she] is
subject to a significant restraint upon [his or her] liberty not

161

Alcoholics Anonymous 2007 Membership Survey, ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS (2008), http://www.aa.org/pdf/products/p-48_07survey.pdf.
162
Local Resources that Provide A.A. Meeting Information, ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS, http://www.aa.org/lang/en/central_offices.cfm?origpage=373
(last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
163
Alcoholics Anonymous 2007 Membership Survey, supra note 161. An
informative PDF released by Alcoholics Anonymous titled Alcoholics
Anonymous as a Resource For Drug & Alcohol Court Professionals states,
“A.A. groups have welcomed many new members from court programs and
treatment facilities. Some have come to A.A. on their own; others arrived
under a degree of pressure. While the voluntary nature of meeting attendance
is part of A.A.’s strength, many A.A.s first attended meetings because
attendance was mandated . . . .” Alcoholics Anonymous as a Resource For
Drug & Alcohol Court Professionals, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS (Nov. 2009),
http://www.aa.org/lang/en/en_pdfs/smf-177_en.pdf.
164
What are A.A. Meetings Like?, ANONYMOUS PRESS, http://anonpress.
org/faq/files/read.asp?fID=166 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
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shared by the public generally.”165 It is unclear whether a onehour time commitment would be deemed a “significant” restraint
on liberty, though it is clearly less of a restraint than the time
commitments held to constitute “custody” in Dow. However, the
principle ultimately stands that court-mandated rehabilitation
requires a person’s “physical presence at a particular place” and
thus restrains the person’s “liberty to do those things which in
this country free [people] are entitled to do.”166
The Ninth Circuit’s finding that mandatory alcohol
rehabilitation constitutes “custody” is not binding on other
jurisdictions and does not end the discussion supporting
mandatory rehabilitation. It simply allows a woman placed in
court-ordered rehabilitation to invoke federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.167 Under this
statute, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . [will]
not be granted unless . . . [1] the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State . . . [2] there is an
absence of available State corrective process[,] or [3]
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the applicant.”168 Because an application may also be
denied on the merits,169 a writ of habeas corpus will not
necessarily be granted simply because the petitioner is within her
rights to apply. As discussed above, a woman who has been
ordered to mandatory outpatient alcohol rehabilitation for giving
birth to a baby with FAS has the right under Dow to apply for a
writ of habeas corpus. The proposal for mandatory outpatient
rehabilitation outlined in this Note does not deprive a woman of
any of the constitutional rights provided to American citizens, and
she is free within the boundaries of the law to appeal her
170
sentencing.

165

Dow v. Circuit Court (Huddy), 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2011).
169
Id. § 2254(b)(2).
170
Hypothetical scenarios that could cause a court to grant a woman’s
application for a writ of habeas corpus are beyond the scope of this Note.
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2. The Flexibility of Modern Outpatient Rehabilitation Programs
The wide variety of outpatient rehabilitation groups affords a
level of flexibility that makes this form of mandatory treatment
significantly less burdensome than inpatient treatment. AA alone
offers features compatible to many different lifestyles, thus
softening restraints upon a woman’s liberty when enrolled in one
of these programs. One concern for mothers participating in
alcohol treatment programs may be childcare while she attends
meetings. It is possible that women mandated to treatment may
not have family or friends available nearby to watch their
children while they attend meetings or may not have the funds to
pay for a babysitter. One AA website includes testimony from a
parent who wrote: “I found meetings where my son could play
in the hall while I sat/stood in the doorway. Many other groups,
like my current homegroup, have use of a nursery.”171
Testimony like this indicates the accessibility and flexibility of
such programs for mothers of young children.
Another likely concern is payment for treatment. Numerous
nationwide outpatient alcohol programs provide services to
members completely free of charge and finance their operations
through voluntary donations, profits from literature sales, and
corporate contributions.172 Because of the variety of outpatient
groups available throughout the United States, women can receive

171

Are Kids Allowed in Meetings?, ANONYMOUS PRESS, http://anonpress.
org/faq/files/read.asp?fID=120 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
172
See, e.g., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, A BRIEF GUIDE TO ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS (1972), available at http://www.aa.org/pdf/products/p42_abriefguidetoaa.pdf (“Newcomers do not pay any fees for membership.
And members do not pay dues.”); FAQs: How Is LifeRing Financed?,
LIFERING, http://lifering.org/faqs/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (“LifeRing is a
nonprofit with 501(c)(3) charitable status. LifeRing is supported by passing
the basket at meetings, sales of LifeRing Press literature, and individual
donations.”); Frequently Asked Questions About SMART Recovery: Where
Does SMART Recovery Get Its Money, and How Does It Spend It?, SMART
RECOVERY, http://www.smartrecovery.org/resources/faq.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2012) (“Primary funding is obtained from individual contributions,
sale of publications, group donations to the Central Office, grants, and
corporate sponsor-level contributions.”).
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necessary treatment with limited inconvenience to their daily
lives.
CONCLUSION
FAS has a negative impact on all parties involved—parents,
schools, courts, and, first and foremost, the affected child,
whose life potential is threatened by the effects of the disease.
Though it is clear that a solution is desperately needed, current
incarceration and civil commitment models contravene a
pregnant woman’s constitutional rights and fail to address
addiction as the root of the problem. FAS statistics will not
improve until alcohol-dependent women are forced to confront
and overcome their addictions, a process that the criminal justice
system is ill equipped to handle. Rather than imposing criminal
sanctions, sentencing a woman to outpatient rehabilitation
provides her with the addiction treatment that is necessary to
prevent future FAS births and to handle the challenges of
parenting an FAS child, within a flexible model that significantly
decreases restrictions on a woman’s liberty. Though this method
will not preclude all FAS births, it will help prevent subsequent
FAS births to mothers with multiple children and will ensure a
healthier home environment for affected children while
respecting the constitutional rights of addicted pregnant women.
It is fair to assume that most women do not choose to be alcohol
dependent and do not want their addictions to cause harm to
their babies in utero. The goal of the proposal outlined in this
Note is to help women, not to punish them. The legal system
may not be able to completely eradicate FAS from society, but it
holds the power to improve today’s troubling statistics and
recognize that certain situations demand treatment that cannot be
solved by traditional forms of criminal punishment.

